A Month After the Mobilization Announcement. Has Anything Really Changed?

Executive Summary

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Our previous report focused on the impact of Putin's mobilization announcement on Russian society. This research overview further elaborates on the initial reactions toward the mobilization, especially highlighting those transforming into strong trends over the past month.

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Overall, the mobilization announcement significantly the conduct among ordinary Russians, with many going abroad, actively avoiding call-up papers, and even protesting. However, the relevant protests organized so far in several regions and Moscow were not critical for the regime and were, therefore, easily curbed.

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With no serious public outcry, the majority accepted the mobilization as-is. Following the announcement of the "partial" mobilization, Vladimir Putin's approval ratings turned out to be insensitive.

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Key Findings

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Mobilization Background

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According to the official statements of the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, up to 300,000 people were expected to be mobilized in Russia. On 31 October, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu reported they the “partial” mobilization had been completed.

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DW reported that young people tried not to go out, turned off the doorbell, and lived outside the place of their official registration to avoid being drafted.

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There were also several failures during the mobilization process, for example, when the Russian military registration and enlistment offices would take away even those who had not served and had severe illnesses.

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War & Mobilization Support

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At first glance, people declaring support for mobilization are in the majority. However, this overarching support drastically decreases once the respondents are anonymous and respond online.

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Besides, the response rate for phone calls is around 6%. Also, after the mobilization announcement, more men tend to ignore calls from unknown numbers likely to be used by local military enlistment offices.

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The vast majority of those who support mobilization receive information from television, remaining confident that the mobilization will not affect them personally. The latter convictions may hold true given the average age (50-59) of the group being the strongest proponents of mobilization and war as such, which is significantly higher than the age of those opposing the war and mobilization.

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Additionally, according to Levada, declared support for the SMO has not changed either (still more than 70%).

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Trust in the Government

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Trust in Putin returned to the pre-mobilization level - 80%.

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However, the unpublished focus groups mentioned that “the respondents were dissatisfied with the way the government has conducted the mobilization process”. Some signs of the emotion of anger were also revealed since the Russian leadership and, specifically, both Putin and Shoigu had promised that no mobilization would be required.

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Mental Well-Being

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As previously reported, Russians experienced a dramatic rise in anxiety after the “partial mobilization” was announced. According to FOM, this trend remained for the month to follow, either.

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The Yasno psychologist search service noted a surge in requests from clients who specifically complain about anxiety.

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The same goes for the focus groups: people mention a general mood of stress among their friends and family.

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Protests Potential

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After the announcement of mobilization, protests spread in several Russian regions, mainly to the republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Yakutia.

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Additionally, according to the FOM polling, more people expected a lot of participation in protests. One month later, this number started decreasing again.

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Nevertheless, there is an interesting spike in online posts that mention forms of non-violent protests in Russian social media. However, it returned to the previous level just a few days after the mobilization was announced.

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Conclusions

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At first, Russian society reacted rather actively to the mobilization announcement. Many Russians left the country, actively avoided mobilization notices, and some even attempted to protest.

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Anxious mood, most probably caused by the fear of mobilization (including of close people) has grown significantly among Russians.

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At the same time, at least according to the polling data, the protest moods are yet insignificant to foster any change. Although it has fallen somewhat, the level of support for Putin and the government as a whole remains at a fairly high level.

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Apparently, the dominant form of resistance among Russians is now limited to flight from the country or attempts to "wait out" difficult times rather than collective protest action.